{"id":2832,"date":"2009-12-01T23:00:00","date_gmt":"2009-12-01T23:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/?p=2832"},"modified":"2021-08-06T13:45:51","modified_gmt":"2021-08-06T13:45:51","slug":"no-time-for-sudan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/no-time-for-sudan\/","title":{"rendered":"No time for Sud\u00e1n"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\" alignleft size-full wp-image-2831\" src=\"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/wp-content\/uploads\/2009\/12\/imgarticulo_no_time_sudan.jpg\" alt=\"imgarticulo_no_time_sudan\" class=\"caption\" style=\"float: left;\" height=\"193\" width=\"150\" \/><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Observing  the Western government and press discourses, gives us the impression  that there are temporary only three hot spots in the world: Afghanistan,  Iraq and Iran. Occasionally the Somalian pirates form part of this  privileged club. It is not surprising that the developments in those  countries are an eyesore for the West&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>  <!--more-->  <\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><figure id=\"attachment_2831\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-2831\" style=\"width: 154px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\" alignleft size-full wp-image-2831\" title=\"Fuente: Keara Duggan\" src=\"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/wp-content\/uploads\/2009\/12\/imgarticulo_no_time_sudan.jpg\" alt=\"imgarticulo_no_time_sudan\" class=\"caption\" style=\"float: left;\" height=\"198\" width=\"154\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-2831\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Fuente: Keara Duggan<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Observing the  Western government and press discourses, gives us the impression that  there are temporary only three hot spots in the world: Afghanistan, Iraq  and Iran. Occasionally the Somalian pirates form part of this  privileged club. It is not surprising that the developments in those  countries are an eyesore for the West, challenging its interests and  regional dominance. Nevertheless Western media, governments and  intergovernmental institutions observe and analyze the problems in the  mentioned countries above all through a military point of view \u2013Iranians  pursuing a nuclear bomb, Somalian pirates attacking ships, Taliban  ambushing and killing NATO troops, etc.\u2013, disregarding the needs and the  miserable situation of the civilian population and the root causes of  the conflict (underdevelopment and exclusion); the Somali\u2019s, the  Iranians, Iraqi\u2019s and Afghans are still privileged compared with the  Congolese, Colombians, Sudanese and other societies who are also  characterized by wide-spread violence and insecurity. Moreover, the  latter societies are not only neglected by the West, but as well by  their own governments.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">A good example  is the conflict in Darfur. This vast region only gets the news when  Western aid staff is kidnapped. Notwithstanding, every self-claiming  serious broadcasting corporation should spend more resources on Sudan.  It is Africa\u2019s biggest country and its internal affairs influence the  broader region. Chadian rebels and Kony\u2019s Lord Resistance Army use Sudan  as a safe haven to prepare their attacks on Chad and Uganda. The  conflict in Darfur and a possible reprise of the civil war between the  South and the North could draw the whole region from Egypt to the  Democratic Republic of the Congo into a negative spiral of instability,  broad-scale violence, refugees, proxy-wars, community tensions, endemic  diseases, etc. Moreover, Sudan takes in an important position in the new  scramble for Africa between the West and Asian countries (in main part  headed by China and to a lesser extent India). Thus, paying more  attention to Sudan\u2019s politics and conflicts is well legitimized.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Today we see  both positive as negative dynamics in Sudan. A positive development is  that regarding to the conflict in Darfur, the United States, Libya and  UNAMID (the UN peacekeeping force in Darfur) are trying to set up a  reunification process among the various rebel groups. The two main  rebels groups that toke up the arms in 2002, the Justice and Equality  Movement (JEM) and Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), are at the moment  divided into various factions, rivaling each other and undermining the  legitimacy and the influence of the broader rebellion movement. Former  adversaries USA and Libya are coordinating their efforts to reunite  dissident factions from SLM and JEM. Last August the new US special  envoy Scott Gration and Qaddafi were successful in convincing five rebel  factions from the SLM to gather in one rebel movement, Sudan\u2019s  Liberation Revolutionary Forces.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Gration believes that the reunification of Darfur rebel groups  is a necessary condition to launch a possible peace process. Problematic  about Gration&#8217;s policy, is his tribal approach of the Darfur problem.  At the same time Washington tries to normalize the bilateral relations  with Sudan. This policy is driven by the apparent view sanctions have  not and will not work and by the priority that the White House gives to  the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In other  words, the United States is ready to compromise on Darfur and Sudan&#8217;s  policy in order to improve the prospects for CPA implementation. Hence,  not surprisingly this new US approach is harshly criticized by JEM and  Abdel Wahid al-Nur, leader of a part of the SLM, who indicates that  former reunification efforts all failed and argues that it would be  better to bundle all efforts in seeking a true solution for the  conflict. Furthermore, he doubts that these new entities are able to  enforce peace agreement once they are signed. Although al-Nur criticism  hits the nail on the head, it conceals uneasiness regarding the US  reunification plans given that they threat al-Nur\u2019s leadership position  and his influence among the Darfurians because one of the results can be  a replacement of al-Nur by another leader. This anxiety is confirmed by  his abrupt turn to be ready to talk to any party willing to achieve a  serious peace instead of demanding first the disarmament of government  militias and the return of IDP\u2019s to their homeland before participating  in any form of peace negotiations.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Negative  developments are: 1) Bashir&#8217;s enhanced internal position, 2) disputes  between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese People  Liberation Movement (SPLM) about the planned April 2010 national  elections, the 2011 referendum and the implementation of the CPA, 3)  clashes in Southern Sudan, and 4) the unchanged situation in Darfur.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Although the  ICC arrest warrant against Bashir put pressure on his position and the  party, causing major disagreements in the NCP, Bashir was able to keep  the support of senior NCP leaders and army force commanders. Moreover,  by putting aside any elements that might threaten his position of  president, he even strengthened his grip on power. Salah Gosh, chief of  National Intelligence and Security Services and seen as one of the main  decision makers concerning Khartoum&#8217;s approach on the handling of the  conflict in Darfur, was removed last August. Another man on the seesaw  seems to be the second vice president Ali Osman Taha. There are  speculations that he would be replaced for a vice president of Darfur, a  maneuver which would remove another potential presidential candidate  and at the same time strengthen Bashir&#8217;s position in Darfur. It is no  secret that the two party leaders have serious disagreements over the  approach for dealing with the South and Darfur. Whereas Taha fears a  further international isolation of Sudan, agreeing to make concessions,  Bashir and his hardliners aggressively oppose any concession on Darfur  and to the SPLM.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">They continue  to provoke both internally as internationally by arming militias in  Darfur and Southern Sudan, blocking or delaying key concessions required  for democratic transformation, causing a major twist with the SPLM  about the percentage of voter turnout in the referendum of 2011 -the NCP  states that a two-third majority is required for Southern Sudanese  independence- and the results of the census that are used to determine  the electoral constituencies for the national legislative elections of  April 2010 -it is now already known that the elections cannot be hold on  time. Moreover they carry on dividing the Darfurian population along  ethnic lines, continue to abuse human rights on a massive scale in  Darfur and to intimate UNAMID by placing impediments on the movement of  the peacekeepers. Furthermore they heat up tensions by announcing the  closing of IDP camps by early 2010. It&#8217;s clear as daylight that the NPC  wants to keep Darfur in chaos. As such, there is limit room for  opposition to emerge and it enables Khartoum&#8217;s key allies in Darfur to  resettle on cleared land and to integrate Janjaweed militias into  official security structures.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Meanwhile the  humanitarian and security situation in Darfur remains shocking \u2013there  are still 2.7 million IDP&#8217;s-, the situation in Southern Sudan  aggravates. There are ongoing clashes between the farming Mundari and  cattle keeping Dinka Bor over access to land, pasture and water,  resulting in the death of hundreds of civilians, the displacement of  thousands and leaving behind an increasingly failing Southern government  vis-\u00e0-vis the protection of its citizens. The starkly failure of the  Southern government and UNMIS to protect civilians from violence, in  particular from intercommunal violence, was already clearly demonstrated  in March and April of this year, when 10 states of Southern Sudan were  hit by the most deadly episode of violence since the end of the 21-year  civil war in 2005. In Jonglei state more than 1,000 people were killed  in clashes over resources like water, land, pasture and livestock. The  fact that frictions turn immediately in armed clashes is a direct  consequence of two decades of civil war and high level of armament among  civilians. In Darfur the same evolution is taking place. With a SPLM  who accuses the NCP of fueling violent clashes through training and  arming militias in Southern Sudan in order to make the Southern  government apparently unable to govern itself ahead of the 2011  referendum and a NCP who continues to provoke antagonism in the ranks of  the SPLM\/A, a reprise of civil war is highly possible.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">It is time that  Europe pays more attention to Sudan. Europe is increasingly losing its  influence in Africa in benefit of China. This is almost daily  demonstrated in Congo, Angola and Sudan. While Europe doesn&#8217;t come to a  unified position vis-\u00e0-vis Sudan and its conflicts, China keeps on to  sign big contracts. In a 260 US million dollar contract, China Petroleum  Engineering Construction Corporation agreed to execute 7 projects in  Sudan&#8217;s oil sector. While Western countries try to pressure Bashir and  to isolate its regime on the one hand and turn their back on Darfur by  not delivering the essential support to the UN peacekeeping forces on  the other hand; Chinese are building schools, constructing roads,  railway lines and participate in UNAMID. In times of a worldwide  economic and financial crisis, global climate change and international  migrant flows, it is striking to see that Europe -both its citizens as  its political leaders- keeps on navel-gazing.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Observing the Western government and press discourses, gives us the impression that there are temporary &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":192,"featured_media":2831,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[182,366],"tags":[],"iecah_area":[],"iecah_language":[],"class_list":["post-2832","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-actualidad","category-articulos-propios"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v17.2 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>No time for Sud\u00e1n - IECAH<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"No time for Sud\u00e1n\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/no-time-for-sudan\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"es_ES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"No time for Sud\u00e1n - 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