{"id":7861,"date":"2015-10-28T23:00:00","date_gmt":"2015-10-28T23:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/?p=7861"},"modified":"2021-09-24T15:09:38","modified_gmt":"2021-09-24T15:09:38","slug":"lo-que-el-ebola-no-deja-ver","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/lo-que-el-ebola-no-deja-ver\/","title":{"rendered":"Lo que el \u00e9bola no deja ver"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\" alignleft size-full wp-image-7860\" style=\"margin: 5px; float: left;\" src=\"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/10\/ebola_David.jpg\" alt=\"Higienistas locales desinfectando la zona roja del Holding Center de Kumala, Koinadugu, Sierra Leona.\" width=\"120\" height=\"90\" \/><\/p>\n<p>En diciembre de 2013, Emile Ouamouno, un ni\u00f1o de apenas un a\u00f1o, fallec\u00eda en una regi\u00f3n rural del sudeste de Guinea, convirti\u00e9ndose en el paciente cero de la mayor epidemia<span style=\"font-size: 12.8000001907349px; line-height: 1.2em;\">&#8230;<br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p><strong><strong><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\" alignleft size-full wp-image-7860\" style=\"margin: 5px; float: left;\" src=\"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/10\/ebola_David.jpg\" alt=\"Higienistas locales desinfectando la zona roja del Holding Center de Kumala, Koinadugu, Sierra Leona.\" width=\"180\" height=\"135\" \/><\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Por Jos\u00e9 David Nebreda Martell<\/p>\n<p>En diciembre de 2013, Emile Ouamouno, un ni\u00f1o de apenas un a\u00f1o, fallec\u00eda en una regi\u00f3n rural del sudeste de Guinea, convirti\u00e9ndose en el paciente cero de la mayor epidemia de enfermedad del virus \u00e9bola (EVE) registrada. La peor pesadilla se hizo realidad cuando la enfermedad, que hasta entonces s\u00f3lo hab\u00eda aparecido en \u00e1reas remotas y poco habitadas, alcanz\u00f3 zonas densamente pobladas de Guinea, Sierra Leona y Liberia, extendi\u00e9ndose con rapidez gracias a una desafortunada combinaci\u00f3n de desconocimiento del virus, costumbres locales que favorec\u00edan su propagaci\u00f3n y una extrema debilidad de los sistemas de salud, saneamiento e informaci\u00f3n de los pa\u00edses afectados. Casi dos a\u00f1os despu\u00e9s del primer caso, tras m\u00e1s de 11.000 muertos y el doble de infectados, muchos consideran la epidemia controlada, mientras que la OMS, los gobiernos afectados y las ONG que han trabajado por contener el virus no bajan la guardia y advierten que a\u00fan queda mucho por hacer.<\/p>\n<p>Se han alcanzado grandes \u00e9xitos: Nigeria control\u00f3 el estallido en sus fronteras muy eficazmente, Liberia ha sido declarado libre de EVE (dos veces debido a un rebrote), Sierra Leona apenas registra casos en su territorio y se avanza s\u00f3lidamente hacia una vacuna. Pero controlada no significa erradicada: grandes zonas del sur de Guinea siguen fuera de control; la OMS y dem\u00e1s organizaciones se esfuerzan en evitar rebrotes en los pa\u00edses afectados y en levantar un cord\u00f3n en pa\u00edses lim\u00edtrofes como Guinea-Bissau y, para colmo, ahora sabemos que el virus permanece en ciertos fluidos de los supervivientes durante mucho m\u00e1s tiempo del que se cre\u00eda (e incluso se reactiva, como en el reciente caso de la enfermera escocesa), elevando as\u00ed las posibilidades de rebrote. Y algunas voces apuntan a que el \u00e9bola no se erradicar\u00e1 de la regi\u00f3n, sino que se har\u00e1 end\u00e9mico.<\/p>\n<p>De la gesti\u00f3n de la crisis del \u00e9bola en \u00c1frica Occidental se pueden extraer valiosas lecciones. La primera y m\u00e1s clara es que la rapidez en la respuesta es crucial. M\u00e9dicos Sin Fronteras, la organizaci\u00f3n con m\u00e1s experiencia en \u00e9bola hasta la fecha, alz\u00f3 la voz de alarma desde pr\u00e1cticamente el inicio de la epidemia. Sin embargo, la comunidad internacional tard\u00f3 meses en activar una respuesta efectiva. La propia directora general de la OMS, Margaret Chan, ha admitido este retraso, que ha costado vidas y ha aumentado los estragos causados por el virus. La segunda es una constante en un mundo globalizado: las crisis nos afectan a todos. S\u00f3lo cuando, meses despu\u00e9s, la amenaza de la epidemia llam\u00f3 a las puertas de Occidente y unos antes ap\u00e1ticos y s\u00fabitamente \u00e1vidos medios de comunicaci\u00f3n comenzaron a se\u00f1alarlo, la comunidad internacional centr\u00f3 su atenci\u00f3n en la epidemia, la situaci\u00f3n empez\u00f3 a revertirse y los recursos t\u00e9cnicos, humanos, econ\u00f3micos y cient\u00edficos empezaron a fluir.<\/p>\n<p>Como cabr\u00eda esperar, coordinar una acci\u00f3n descentralizada, en varios pa\u00edses, con m\u00faltiples actores (gobiernos locales y nacionales, organismos internacionales, fuerzas de seguridad, ONG, sociedad civil, comunidades y muchos m\u00e1s), en una situaci\u00f3n fluida y ante una crisis multidimensional no ha sido tarea f\u00e1cil. Es una crisis multidimensional porque la respuesta ha sido estructurada en varios pilares: atenci\u00f3n m\u00e9dica, seguridad alimentaria, apoyo psicosocial a supervivientes, movilizaci\u00f3n social, vigilancia y prevenci\u00f3n de infecciones&#8230; Adem\u00e1s de aspectos como seguridad, recuperaci\u00f3n econ\u00f3mica, refuerzo de capacidades locales y continuaci\u00f3n de la lucha contra la pobreza en una de las zonas m\u00e1s vulnerables y castigadas del planeta. Aunque tama\u00f1a tarea ha tenido \u00e9xito en el control y supresi\u00f3n de la enfermedad en Liberia y Sierra Leona, los expertos temen que el descontrol en el sur de Guinea d\u00e9 pie a nuevos brotes. En resumen, se ha ganado una batalla important\u00edsima, pero la guerra no est\u00e1 acabada. O, tal vez, haya m\u00e1s guerras que luchar.<\/p>\n<p>Por ejemplo, la respuesta ha sido considerada una emergencia tradicional, cuando sus fuertes implicaciones con el desarrollo y, sobre todo, su larga duraci\u00f3n, requieren m\u00e1s atenci\u00f3n a la fase de transici\u00f3n. As\u00ed, muchas organizaciones han estado funcionando a ritmo de emergencia (altas rotaciones, elevado ritmo de trabajo, enfoque puramente asistencial) cuando ya no hab\u00eda pacientes: retrasando el paso a desarrollo, reduciendo la informaci\u00f3n retenida (la gente se marchaba a las 6 semanas) y aumentando el desgaste del personal innecesariamente. Los donantes segu\u00edan dando dinero para tratar una enfermedad, cuando lo que hac\u00eda falta era adoptar medidas de prevenci\u00f3n comunitarias, intentar recobrar la normalidad y reforzar los sistemas sanitarios. Por ejemplo, en Sierra Leona hubo una reducci\u00f3n muy significativa de pacientes en abril, pero las reformulaciones de proyectos, reasignaciones de fondos y cambios de estrategia hacia recuperaci\u00f3n y desarrollo empezaron a tener lugar hacia julio, perdi\u00e9ndose as\u00ed meses de trabajo y los recursos que cuesta mantener un sistema de atenci\u00f3n que apenas atiende pacientes, en lugar de solventar cualquiera de las otras miles de necesidades. Afortunadamente, este cambio ya se ha dado, pero muchos donantes oficiales no ven tanta urgencia en esto como en una epidemia, y los fondos se reducen. La reconstrucci\u00f3n y el desarrollo no son tan atractivos como la emergencia a la hora de captar recursos.<\/p>\n<p>Asimismo, la atenci\u00f3n medi\u00e1tica decae cada vez m\u00e1s. Se habla muy poco de esos pa\u00edses, una vez que parece que la epidemia ha remitido. As\u00ed, ha pasado desapercibido el efecto de las fuertes inundaciones que azotaron hace unas semanas a Freetown, capital de Sierra Leona, dejando cientos de personas sin hogar, con los consiguientes retos de salud que eso comporta. Gracias a la fuerte presencia de ONG en la zona, la atenci\u00f3n a los damnificados pudo ser inmediata, pero si hubieran tenido que esperar a la cobertura medi\u00e1tica (que apenas lleg\u00f3) para recibir ayuda, no ser\u00eda descabellado afirmar que la situaci\u00f3n habr\u00eda sido much\u00edsimo peor.<\/p>\n<p>Otro problema que ha causado la respuesta a la epidemia es que todos los recursos se han centrado exclusivamente en atenderla. Mientras los escasos y mal equipados centros hospitalarios y de salud deben atender a la poblaci\u00f3n con escas\u00edsimos recursos, los centros de tratamiento y decalaje (triage) de \u00e9bola, bien equipados, se han visto impotentes para ayudar a los enfermos que acud\u00edan a sus puertas puesto que no padec\u00edan EVE. Estos vac\u00edos en la salud p\u00fablica terminan por provocar brotes de sarampi\u00f3n y otras enfermedades prevenibles, debido a la suspensi\u00f3n de las campa\u00f1as de vacunaci\u00f3n el a\u00f1o pasado por miedo a infecciones. Adem\u00e1s, no puede extra\u00f1ar que el escaso personal sanitario local, muy castigado por la enfermedad al comienzo de la epidemia, aproveche las enormes oportunidades, formaci\u00f3n y experiencia adquirida para buscar otros lugares donde ejercer, dejando las zonas m\u00e1s remotas y vulnerables en manos de voluntarios menos cualificados. Lo an\u00e1logo se puede decir de la educaci\u00f3n, el turismo, el comercio y muchos servicios p\u00fablicos.<\/p>\n<p>Pero que resaltemos lo negativo no desmerece el gran trabajo realizado. Esos trabajadores locales y expatriados han arriesgado sus vidas para contener la enfermedad y lo han conseguido. Se han aprendido muchas lecciones y se han salvado muchas vidas. Pero ahora que la crisis amaina, cuando vuelven otros problemas tan graves como el \u00e9bola que nunca dejaron de estar ah\u00ed, no debemos dejar de prestar atenci\u00f3n. En 2014, estos sanitarios, doctores, higienistas, logistas, militares, t\u00e9cnicos, conductores, enterradores, enfermeros y voluntarios detuvieron una epidemia letal y fuera de control bajo la atenta mirada del mundo. No seamos cortos de memoria y honremos su lucha; ayudemos a continuarla, no s\u00f3lo para que el \u00e9bola s\u00f3lo sea un mal recuerdo, sino para que los pa\u00edses que lo sufrieron salgan adelante.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><strong>What remains unseen after Ebola\u00a0<em> (English)<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>December 2013: 1-year-old Emile Ouamouno dies in a rural area in Southeastern Guinea. He is patient zero of the biggest Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak ever seen. The nightmare became a reality when the disease, until then only present in very remote and isolated areas, hit densely populated zones in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, swiftly spreading thanks to an unfortunate combination of ignorance of the virus, local traditions that favored its spread and extreme weakness of the local sanitation, health and information systems of the affected countries. Almost two years after the first case, with 11,000 deaths and nearly twice as many infections, most people consider the epidemic under control; while WHO, the governments of the affected countries and the NGOs who have fought against it won&#8217;t call it a victory just yet and warn that there is still a lot to do.<\/p>\n<p>Big achievements have been made: Nigeria controlled the outbreak within its borders with great efficiency, Liberia has been declared free of EVD (twice, due to a new sprout), Sierra Leone has barely any cases left and there are solid advances towards a vaccine. But controlling a disease does not mean eradicating it: big areas in Southern Guinea are still out of control, WHO and other organizations work to avoid new outbreaks and build a sanitary cordon in bordering countries like Guinea-Bissau and now we know that the virus remains in survivors&#8217; fluids for much longer than we thought, and might even reactivate (as shown by the case of Scottish nurse, Pauline Cafferkey), increasing the chances of new outbreaks. Some experts say that Ebola will not be eradicated, but rather become endemic in the region.<\/p>\n<p>Valuable lessons can be learnt from Western Africa&#8217;s EVD crisis management. First, that a swift response is crucial. MSF, the organization most experienced with Ebola, raised the alarm from the very beginning of the epidemic. However, it took months for the international community to assemble an effective response. WHO director Margaret Chan admitted that the delay had a terrible cost in lives lost. The second is something often heard: in a globalized world, crises affect us all. It was only months later, when the disease was knocking on the doors of the West, that the previously apathetic media took notice and the international community centered its attention on the problem. Human, economic, technical and scientific resources started to flow and the situation began to revert.<\/p>\n<p>As would be expected, it has not been easy to coordinate a decentralized action in several countries, facing a multidimensional crisis in a changing environment and with the participation of multiple actors (local and national Governments, international organizations, security forces, NGOs, civil society and many more.)It is a multidimensional crisis because the response was structured on several pillars: healthcare, food security, survivor psychosocial support, social mobilization, infection prevention &amp; control. Plus other related aspects such as security, economic recovery, reinforcement of local capacities and fight against poverty in one of the most deprived regions of the globe. Although the endeavor has been mostly successful in the control and suppression of the disease in Liberia and Sierra Leone, experts warn of the risk of new outbreaks originating in southern Guinea. In sum: a very important battle has been won, but the war is not over yet. Or maybe it is that there are more wars to fight.<\/p>\n<p>For instance, the whole response to the outbreak has been conducted as a traditional emergency, when its duration and strong developmental implications require a longer-term approach and a stronger focus on transition. Thus, most organizations have worked with an emergency mindset (meaning high worker rotation, heavier work intensity, a more responsive approach) even when there were no patients and they were on stand-by. This has delayed the beginning of the recovery work, unnecessarily increased the personnel burnout and reduced the daily operational know-how (rotations lasted 6 weeks on average, even in non-medical roles.) Donors were still giving money to treat patients when what was really needed were prevention measures, a way back to normality and reinforce the healthcare systems of the affected communities. For instance, Sierra Leone experienced a significant decrease in patients from April on, but most project reformulations, funds relocations and strategy shifts towards recovery and development started taking place in July; losing the working hours and resources that kept the patient care system on stand-by with almost no cases instead of tacking any other of the myriad of needs present. Luckily, this change has already occurred, but it has shown that some official donors do not consider recovery the same way they considered the epidemic, and funding shrinks. Reconstruction and development are not as appealing as emergency when it comes to attract funds.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, media attention decays. Once the outbreak slackened, little is heard about these countries. The strong rains and subsequent flooding that struck Freetown, capital of Sierra Leone, a few weeks ago has gone almost unnoticed despite having left hundreds homeless and significant health and sanitation challenges to be tackled. Thanks to the strong presence of health NGOs in the area, victims could be immediately assisted; but had they had to wait for media coverage (which was barely present) to get help, it would not sound crazy to say that the situation could have been much worse.<\/p>\n<p>Another problem caused by the EVD epidemic response is that all resources were almost exclusively centered in dealing with the disease. While the scarce and ill-equipped health centers had to treat the general population with very little resources, ETCs and HCs (Ebola Treatment Centers and Holding Centers) full of supplies and skilled personnel were powerless to help patients coming to them with health problems other than EVD. These voids in public health have had consequences, such as outbreaks of measles and other easily preventable diseases due to the suspension of vaccination campaigns last year. It should not be surprising either that the few qualified local health staff take the great opportunities coming with the new education and experience acquired during the crisis to seek other towns of countries to work, leaving the most remote and vulnerable areas in the hands of volunteers and staff with less qualification. Analogies to this can be found in the education, tourism, public services or business sectors.<\/p>\n<p>Bit highlighting the negative points should not devaluate the great job done. Those local and expatriate workers have risked their lives to contain the disease and have succeeded. Lots of lessons have been learnt, lots of lives have been saved. But now that the crisis recedes, now that other problems as serious as EVD that were there all along, we should not stop paying attention. In 2014 health workers, doctors, hygienists, nurses, logisticians, military men, burial teams, technicians, drivers and volunteers stopped a lethal epidemic threatening to spread all over the world. Let us not be forgetful and honor their fight; let us help continuing it, not only to turn Ebola into just a bad memory, but also to help the countries who suffered it stand up and keep walking forward.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>En diciembre de 2013, Emile Ouamouno, un ni\u00f1o de apenas un a\u00f1o, fallec\u00eda en una &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":321,"featured_media":7860,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[182,366],"tags":[234],"iecah_area":[],"iecah_language":[387],"class_list":["post-7861","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-actualidad","category-articulos-propios","tag-accion-humanitaria","iecah_language-espanol"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v17.2 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Lo que el \u00e9bola no deja ver - IECAH<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ul-standards.org\/iecah\/lo-que-el-ebola-no-deja-ver\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"es_ES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Lo que el \u00e9bola no deja ver - 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